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4 
 Real HP growth in UK over last 40 years has been 
extraordinarily high by international standards… 
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Stylized fact 2 
Volatility has increased in recent decades… 
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Stylized fact 3 
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 Despite extraordinary price growth since 1970, 
construction has been in continuous decline… 
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Stylized fact 4 
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 There are not only fewer new-build homes but these 
are also extremely small by international standards  
 A new-build house in UK is 38% smaller than in densely 
populated Germany and… 
 40% smaller than in the even more densely populated 
Netherlands (Statistics Sweden 2005) 
 And houses are built in the wrong places: very little 
construction in the prosperous South 
 Very little new housing in e.g. Oxford & Cambridge 
(compared to say Doncaster or Barnsley) 
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Derived research questions 
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 What factors constrain housing supply (and 
thereby cause the corresponding high level 
and volatility of prices)? 
 
Might the British system of land use 
planning be a – or the main – culprit? 
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Some background:  
The British system of land use planning 
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 Today’s planning system established in 1947 
through Town and Country Planning Act 
 Key features 
 Expropriated development rights of land 
owners 
 Designated ‘use’ classes, whereas any change 
of ‘use’ requires development control 
permission (granted at local level) 
 Aim is ‘development control’ or ‘containment’ 
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The London green belt 
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Source: Barney’s blog  
(http://barneystringer.wordpress.com/2013/11/21/londons-green-belt) 
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But not just green belt containment – 
many other planning constraints… 
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Who decides in UK? 
16 
 Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) grant or reject planning 
applications 
 Problem: Since 1947 virtually no fiscal incentives at local 
level to permit development (costs far exceed benefits) 
 Central government grant equalisation system in medium-
term more or less eliminates any revenue gain for LPAs 
that permit more development 
 
 Underlying causes?  
 
 UK = highly centralized country, virtually no fiscal power at 
local level 
 Planning system tilts political power towards homeowners 
(NIMBYs) 
 
 Local long-run supply curve nearly vertical… 
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Theoretical prediction… 
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How to test? 
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 Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) 
 Exploit spatial variation in three different 
types of supply constraints: regulatory, 
scarcity of developable land and topography 
 Interact supply constraints with demand 
shifters (local earnings; labour demand shock) 
 Use instrumental variable technique to 
identify causal effect of local supply 
constraints measures on local house prices 
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Main findings 
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 Tight local planning constraints in parts of 
England (in conjunction with strong demand) 
are to a large extent responsible for 
extraordinarily high house prices  
 
 Local scarcity of developable land matters 
but very non-linearly (only in most developed 
locations)  
 
 Topography matters in statistical sense but 
very little in economic (quantitative) sense… 
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Quantitative effects  
(based on IV with all instruments) 
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 If planning were completely relaxed  
in average LPA: 
 House prices in average LPA: -35% 
 and developable land were abundant: 
 House prices in average LPA: -45% (Δ= -10%) 
 and LPA were completely flat: 
 House prices in average LPA: -48% (Δ= -3%) 
Note: These are likely lower bound estimates for a number of reasons  
(see Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016, for details) 
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What would house prices in  
average English LPA be if… 
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
H
o
u
se
 p
ri
ce
s 
in
 2
0
0
8
 p
o
u
n
d
s
1974 1980 1990 2000 2008
Year
Predicted real house prices in average English LPA
Prediction with refusal rate set to zero
- and share developed set to zero
- and elevation range set to zero
- and earnings assumed constant
226k 
147k 
124k 
117k 
112k 
23 
Intro – Stylized Facts      Features of British system      Empirical evidence      Assessment of housing policies      Conclusions 
North East vs. South East & 
90th vs. 10th percentile 
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But large variation across locations… 
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Preliminary conclusions: 
There are two fundamental issues… 
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1. Planning system effectively assigns development 
rights to local policy makers, planners & NIMBYs  
 In contrast: In most other countries, development is 
rule based – if land is zoned as residential, 
presumption is in favour of development 
2. Lack of fiscal incentives to develop at local level 
 Discourages local authorities to permit development 
(most costs – little benefits!) – NIMBYism reinforces 
 Creates incentives to impose horizontal restrictions 
(Green Belt) and vertical ones (height restrictions etc.) 
 
 1. + 2. jointly cause affordability crisis! 
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The planning and tax system  
determine housing affordability 
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…And urban form 
29 
 
Dutch concentrated dispersal 
Wider South East 
green belt constraint 
Flemish region dispersal Source: Echenique (2009) 
Reading 
 Similar densities 
 Less restrictive 
planning 
associated with 
more sprawl… 
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Business rates reform 
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 Idea 
 Devolve fiscal power to tax businesses to Local 
Authorities 
 Aim: Boost enterprise and economic activity 
 Proposal 
 By 2020 LAs retain 100% of revenue from business 
rates (~£26 billion) replacing current retention scheme 
 Replaces core grant funding for LA services 
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Key concern 
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 If LAs can indeed keep all revenue this should 
provide more incentives to permit commercial 
development on brownfield land, great but… 
 
 Problem: May divert brownfield land away from 
housing (substitution effect) so probably even less 
new housing, reinforcing affordability problem! 
 
 (If central government grants were to offset 
business rate revenue, then no effect at all) 
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Empirical evidence 
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 Cheshire and Hilber for UK (2008) 
 (Reverse) Reform of business rates in April 1990: creation 
of Uniform Business Rate (except for City of London) 
 Reform generated strong fiscal disincentive for LAs (except 
City of London) to permit commercial development 
 Created huge “Regulatory Tax” making British office space 
(some of the) dearest in world 
 Average 1990-2005 in % of MCC 
 London West End      809% 
 City of London  488% 
 Canary Wharf  327% 
 Paris La Defence  167% 
 Brussels   68% 
 NYC   0-50% 
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Empirical evidence (cont.) 
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 Quigley and Raphael (2005) for California 
 
 Jurisdictions in California can benefit from sales tax 
revenues, whereas property taxes are limited to 1 
percent of the transaction price 
 
 California’s tax policies created fiscal disincentives to 
build new housing in favor of expensive retail 
buildings! 
 Various other studies with similar findings 
 Burnes et al. (2012) for Florida 
 Jacob and McMillen (2015) for Chicago 
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Other problems 
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 Which public services are funded with local business 
rates? 
 Can’t be social welfare (redistribution) 
 Not education or police 
 Public infrastructure (transport, electricity, gas, water, 
broadband)? Garbage collection? 
 How to ensure revenue and spending are congruent? 
 Further incentive-issues 
 LAs may focus spending on services that attract businesses 
rather than residents 
 LAs may try to outsource new housing developments to 
neighbouring LAs (free-riding), increasing commute 
distances 
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Other proposed policies 
36 
1. Housing construction targets 
2. Help-to-Buy and other demand subsidies  
3. Increase in stamp duty on buy-to-let properties & 
second homes (Autumn Statement) 
4. Limit on increase of rents for social tenants 
(Chancellor announcement) 
5. Allowing local authorities to build starter homes 
on Green Belt (DCLG consultation document) 
6. Expansion of Right-to-Buy (Autumn Statement) 
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1. Housing construction targets 
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 Idea: Announce housing construction targets to 
encourage development 
 
 Problem: Targets alone neither tilt development 
rights in favour of development nor do they 
provide fiscal incentives 
 
 Expected effect: Nil! 
 
 Evidence: Construction in decline since 1970 
despite ever increasing targets by all parties and 
consecutive governments of different colours 
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2. Help-to-Buy &  
other subsidies to homebuyers 
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 Idea: Subsidise demand for owner-occupied housing 
 Problem: Local supply extremely price inelastic, in 
particular in London & South East 
 
 Expected effect: Policy raises prices but does not spur 
development 
 Evidence:  
 House prices in London rose by 25.8% b/w 2013Q2 and 
2014Q4 & there was no housing construction boom! 
 Evidence from US: In tightly regulated cities demand 
subsidies are counterproductive (Hilber & Turner 2014) 
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3. Increase in stamp duty on  
buy-to-let properties & second homes  
39 
 Idea: Discourage buy-to-let & second homes 
 
 Expected effects: Makes buy-to-let and second homes 
less attractive compared to owner-occupation 
 Buy-to-let: Increase in stamp duty will reduce supply of 
private rental homes  Increase in private rents & possibly 
slight reduction in price of owner-occupied homes 
 Second homes: Might increase supply of primary homes in 
short-run and slightly reduce house prices (good!) but may 
provide even fewer incentives to add new housing (bad!) 
 
 Overall: Likely zero sum; private rental will become 
less affordable and owner-occupied housing slightly 
more affordable 
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4. Limit on increase of rents  
for social tenants 
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 Idea: Make social housing more affordably by 
limiting social rent increase (to e.g. 1% p.a.) 
 
 Problem: Reduces book value of social rented 
housing stock  reduces ability of housing 
associations to finance additional social housing 
development  
 
 Expected effects: Less new social housing  few 
lucky social tenants but even greater affordability 
crisis for all other young and low income 
households 
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5. Allowing local authorities to build  
starter homes on Green Belt 
41 
 Idea: Relax (somewhat) constraints to build starter 
homes at edge of green belts & on brown-field 
land within green belts 
 
 Expected effects:  
 Tiny fraction of green belt is brownfield 
 Only possible if local authority wants it! 
 
 Problem: Local authorities still have no fiscal 
incentives to develop, especially not in green belt, 
so at best ‘a drop on a hot stone’. 
 But does send signal that low-amenity-value land in 
green belts may no longer be sacrosanct! 
 
 
Intro – Stylized Facts      Features of British system      Empirical evidence      Assessment of housing policies      Conclusions 
6. Expansion of Right-to-Buy  
42 
 Idea: Expand RTB to housing association tenants 
 
 Expected effects:  
 Incentivises owner-occupation – may or may not be 
welfare increasing  
 But in any case: at huge cost to taxpayer because 
housing associations must be compensated for losses 
 IF they are not: Policy will endanger ability of 
associations to finance new homes, so may reduce 
new construction 
 Also creates more ‘homevoter’ NIMBYs, which in turn 
may further reduce new housing construction! 
 
 
Intro – Stylized Facts      Features of British system      Empirical evidence      Assessment of housing policies      Conclusions 
Conclusions 
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 Planning serves important purpose - in principle it 
can improve welfare through correcting market 
failure such as externalities and public goods  
 
 But British planning and tax systems have serious 
“design flaws”: 
 ‘Development control’ blindly favours containment 
and generates great degree of uncertainty 
 Lack of local fiscal incentives reinforces problem 
 Existing and proposed policies do not tackle these 
flaws – policies are, at best, ineffective but often 
counterproductive 
Intro – Stylized Facts      Features of British system      Empirical evidence      Assessment of housing policies      Conclusions 
So what ought policy makers do? 
Some guiding principles… 
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 Radical reforms needed that simultaneously 
address flaws of planning and tax system 
 
 
 Planning system ought to… 
1. Focus on correcting market failures: Designate 
parks, areas of natural beauty, historic buildings 
etc. that are off hands from (re-)development and 
2. Change to rule based zoning system: Introduce 
presumption in favour of development in areas that 
are not protected 
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So what ought policy makers do? 
Some guiding principles… 
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 Tax system ought to…  
1. Align fiscal incentives to develop: Local residents 
& neighbours who bear costs also ought to be 
able to reap benefits 
2. Move away from stamp duty & demand subsidies 
towards impact fees (reflecting marginal social 
costs) and genuine local property tax or LVT  
3. Consider permitting private compensation 
payments 
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Q & A 
 
Thank you! 
 
Presentation with references & hyperlinks  
will be downloadable from:  
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hilber/ 
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